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Abstract
Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity are usually the only
ones compensated with a residual that varies with the performance of the team.  This pattern is
efficient, as is shown by the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams and when
specialized monitoring is ineffective.  Profit sharing in repeated team production induces all
team members to take disciplinary action against underperformers through switching and
separation decisions, however.  Such action provides effective self-enforcement when the
markets for team members are competitive, even for large teams using specialized monitoring.
The traditional share system of fishing firms shows that for this competition to provide
powerful enough incentives the costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must
be low.  Risk allocation may constrain the organizational design defined by the use of a share
system. It does not account for its existence, however.
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1. Introduction: Team Production and the Organizational Structure of the Firm
What is so rare about fishing that makes residual claim labor contracts so prominent and
fixed wage labor contracts so rare?  A wide variety of crews ranging in size from two to one
hundred and using all kinds of fishing technologies have for ages been paid in a unconventional
way by receiving shares in the catch.  The main purpose of this paper is to explain this apparent
anomaly.  In so doing we also expect to learn about the conditions that make the conventional
structure of the firm prevalent, featuring a labor contract with wages unrelated to the firm’s
product.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) characterized team production by two features.  First, the
production of the team is greater than the aggregation of individual products.  Second, it is
costly to ascertain the contribution of every team member to the team product.  Thus,
assuming utility-maximizing individuals, it is necessary to put in place mechanisms to avoid
shirking or free riding, which we will refer to as control systems.
From the point of view of the contractual costs involved in team production, the main
design problem consists of finding the minimum of a total cost with two components:  (a) First,
the cost of collective action, caused by the proclivity of team members to shirk when their
compensation does not vary with individual productivity (this is a residual loss in comparison
with the ideal collective optimum).  (b) Second, the cost of control, derived from the fact that
in order to contain the collective action cost, mechanisms must be put in place to estimate
individual contributions and pay team members in accordance with these estimations. The
objective is to internalize in each individual the consequences that his behavior has for the
performance of the whole team.  This is achieved by means of different control systems that are
more or less cost-effective depending on the level of internalization they can achieve.
Additionally, organizations structure teams in terms of size and hierarchy and carefully assign
decision rights among teams and team members.1  These decisions make up the problems of
                                               
1 See, on this, Jensen (1983) and, mainly, Jensen and Meckling (1992).4
internal divisionalization of the organization.  We will assume, however, that these solutions as
well as bonding activities by team members are not important in our context.
Under the Alchian and Demsetz conditions of team production —i.e., when the marginal
productivity of each individual is costly to ascertain—, an organizational pattern that pays a
residual only to the party who controls individual productivity tends to be optimal as a way of
motivating him to perform this control function efficiently.  This party has the right to
renegotiate all contracts and holds an exclusive right to the residual claim to the firm’s value.
Under such conditions, profit sharing is thought to be efficient only for small teams and when
specialized monitoring is ineffective.2
This paper studies a case where, even if these conditions do not hold, a compensation
pattern based on profit or revenue sharing is efficient.  The empirical evidence and the analysis
made in the paper show that under certain conditions (mainly low costs of switching teams and
measuring the team’s product) a solution might be optimal in which the residual-claimant
status of the controller seems to be diluted.  Making team members residual claimants in the
short run better ensures that all kinds of underperforming conduct is promptly penalized.
Competition for good team members amongst teams thus secures optimal performance levels
in the long run.3  This result indirectly suggests that the conventional structure of capitalist
firms is connected to the prevalence of conditions that are substantially different from those we
observe in the fishing industry.
The problem of fishing firms is closely related to but different from that of share contracts.
The terminology here might be confusing.  In a share contract there is also more than one
                                               
2 See, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz (1972, pp. 785-786).
3 Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 781) already mentioned that strictly market-based competition may
act as a monitor of team performance.  They focussed on competition exerted by potential team
members offering to replace shirking members.  (See also Alchian and Allen, 1983, p. 171.)  We will
see that in the fishing industry competition takes place through the departure of the most productive
workers to the best performing teams, which motivates efficient monitoring even under profit sharing.
To the extent that there are also dismissals, the fishing system might be seen as not completely market-
based.  However, this would be incorrect, as incentives to dismiss underperformers are mainly provided
by the possibility that, otherwise, the best performers leave the team.5
residual claimant.4  However, the standard problem in a share contract has to do with bilateral
relations, whereas the distinguishing feature of fishing firms is that a kind of profit-sharing is
applied to teams which range from two to close to a hundred direct contractual parties (or
more than that in some non-fishing but similar activities, like privateering).  This defines a
substantially different problem.5  One way of looking at this difference is to consider both the
share contract and “teamsharing” as enforcement devices.  Share contracts are generally
thought to provide self-enforcement through the direct effect that sharing has on the incentives
of the parties (e.g., motivating work effort or discouraging opportunistic renegotiation or exit).
However, these effects either become trivial when the number of parties increases enough
(work effort),6 or are thought to be irrelevant in fishing (renegotiation being controlled by
repetition and premature exit being simply impossible in the vast majority of cases).  The
presence of indirect effects the effectiveness of which is independent of team size is needed for
sharing to provide effective enforcement of team contracts in general, of which bilateral
sharing is only the simplest case.  This paper focus on these indirect effects, connected as
mentioned to market competition.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 firstly describes a cross-section sample of fish
sharing systems and then presents historical evidence of the prevalence of sharing not only in
fishing but also in piracy.  Section 3 shows that fish sharing may be explained as a way of
                                               
4 There is a huge literature on sharecropping. Initial analyses by Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz (1974)
focused mainly on risk-allocation.  Later on, transaction costs explanations played the main role.
Among the latter, Hallagan (1978); Alston, Samar and Nugent (1984); Allen (1985); Eswaran and
Kotwald (1985); and Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993 and 1996); among many others.
5 The literature on fishing firms nevertheless parallels that of sharecropping.  The share system in the
fishing industry has mainly been considered as a mechanism for dealing with uncertainty and for
spreading out the risk among all fishery members [see Sutinen (1979), Bodvarsson (1987, pp. 424-7),
Plourde and Smith (1989, pp. 181-4) and Platteau and Nugent (1992, pp. 390-8)], even if some moral
hazard and adverse selection arguments have been advanced to explain some features of the
arrangements [see Platteau and Nugent (1992, pp. 398-408), Gifford (1993, pp. 143-145), and
Matthiasson (1997, pp. 11-18)].  Both arguments are also present in anthropological works, although
the risk argument is more explicit: see, e.g., Firth (1966, pp. 256-7), Forman (1970, p. 83), McGoodwin
(1979, pp. 331-4) and Acheson (1981, p. 278).
6 This is also the reason for another difference.  Share contracts are thought to substitute for direct
supervision of effort (e.g., Alston and Higgs, 1982).  However, fish sharing does not eliminate the need
for monitoring, which is one of the crucial roles played by captains, skippers and other officers.6
generating powerful incentives by means of competition amongst teams for the best productive
resources.  It focuses on the role that low switching costs play in allowing this competition to
play an effective role.  Section 4 shows the role of measurement costs in allowing different
share solutions focussing on two issues.  First, how the low cost of measuring team product is
necessary for team-sharing to be used.  Second, how cost-sharing similarly depends on the
costs of measuring specific inputs.  The role of risk allocation is analyzed in Section 5.  First,
the simple risk-spreading argument is rejected as a rationale for the share system.  It is shown
that risk allocation might play a constraining role however.  Thus, some contractual patterns
might be understood as risk allocation instruments, although explanations based on incentives
and measurement costs seem equally plausible.  Exceptions to the share system are explained in
Section 6 as adaptations to specific circumstances.  Finally, Section 7 presents a summary and
some concluding remarks.
2. Types of Sharefishing Systems
Three main systems must be considered when analyzing the organizational variations in
firms in the fishing industry from the point of view of their compensation patterns: full profit
sharing in small boats, partial profit sharing in medium-sized boats and revenue sharing in the
largest vessels (Table 1).  These structures are relatively consistent across different countries
and branches of the fishing industry.7  They are therefore related by their consequences rather
                                               
7 Our data comes from a large number of intensive case studies and two statistical samples, mainly
refers to vessels physically based in the North of Spain which are registered and fish all over the world.
Their compensation structures are similar to those used in other countries and in earlier times, however.
Perhaps the most comprehensive survey on this topic is a report by the International Labor Office
(1952), which shows that the share system is the dominant practice all around the world.  This coincides
with a more recent survey of the Food and Agriculture Organization (1992, section on “Fisheries
Data”).  Acheson (1981) also offers relevant references in countries as diverse as Canada, Sweden,
Mexico, Sri Lanka, Ecuador or Ghana.  For other specific areas, see Firth (1946, pp. 235-57), Zoetewij
(1956), Forman (1970, pp. 81-92), Gaur (1970), Pollnac (1978), McGoodwin (1979), Sutinen (1979),
Barandiarán (1982), Bodvarsson (1987), Lleonart (1988), Plourde and Smith (1989), and Craig and
Knoeber (1992).  We also have evidence of its existence in Spain at least as far back as the XVIII
century (Sáñez, 1791-1795, pp. 321-322).7
than by their origins, and are probably the result of parallel evolution — an efficient answer to
common environmental pressures.  Let us firstly look more closely at what is considered the
most traditional and sophisticated system, characterized by partial profit sharing.
2.1. Partial Profit Sharing in Medium-Sized Boats
This compensation structure applies to vessels fishing in deep-sea grounds for periods of 2
to 14 weeks, with 11 to 13 crewmen and boats ranging from 25 to 150 tons.  In the Bay of
Biscay, these vessels use two main fishing techniques, “trawling” and “long-line fishing”.
Trawling consists in simply throwing a large enclosing net and trawling it along the ocean.  It is
a capital-intensive technique because it is based on powerful engines that drag a large net.
“Long-line fishing” or simply “lining” is more labor-intensive since it uses a long fishing tackle
with 4,000 to 14,000 hooks that must be prepared by hand.
Participants in this traditional fishing firm include: the shipowner, who can be an individual,
a partnership or a company; the captain or fishing skipper, who is responsible for the vessel
and handles navigation while fishing; the coast skipper, who substitutes the skipper as the
second in command, shares fishing information with him, keeps an eye on the crew,
communicates disputes, performs administrative tasks relating to both the vessel and the crew
and also steers the vessel when it is not fishing; the machinist, who looks after the engines and
the freezing and the electrical systems, sometimes assisted by a greaser or second machinist;
the cook, whose task obviously is to prepare the food; and, finally, the common crewmen, it
being understood that in addition to their specialized functions as coast skippers, machinists,
greasers or cooks these crew members work also as fishermen.
These medium-sized boats adopt the most standard version of the “share system”,
according to which fishermen’s earnings vary greatly with the value of the catch and with
some, but not all, of the expenditures incurred for each specific sailing.  The difference
between the ordinary and skilled fishermen (the two skippers and the machinist) is that the
latter are paid larger shares.  The shipowner earns the remaining income (Figure 1).  The
distribution of rewards begins with the monetary value of the catch obtained in each trip or8
voyage, which is established in open auction amongst industrial consumers and intermediaries
in the highly organized and competitive fish markets that exist in all large fishing ports.
Sharing follows a convoluted procedure.  Firstly, a small quantity of fish is distributed as
compensation in-kind among crewmembers.  Gross revenue obtained from selling the rest of
the catch is then reduced by the commission paid to the market (between 3.5 and 4.5%).  Next
to be paid are common expenditures, which are collectively supported, such as food
provisions, Social Security charges, fishing tackle (nets, rods, lines, etc.), bait, salt and ice.
The shipowner finances these common expenditures, recovering them only after the catch is
sold.  If the value of the catch is lower than the expenditures, the difference is accumulated and
deducted from future catches.
At this time, a fixed compensation is also paid to the crew.  Fishermen thus receive a small
wage coming directly from the catch value, as do common expenditures before the main
partition of net revenue between capital and labor is made.  This is not strictly a fixed
compensation since it is defined most commonly as a percentage of gross revenue or as a fixed
amount per month whichever is lower, and fishermen do not earn it if the catch is not valuable
enough to meet all the common expenditures.  In practice, however, it can be considered as a
fixed wage given that catches small enough not to recover such expenditures are very rare and
even in this case payment of expenses might be postponed.
Once the common expenditures and this fixed compensation are deducted,8 the resulting
net revenue is divided into two parts, one for the ship-owner (the “ship’s part”) and the other
for the crew (“the people’s part”).  In traditional wooden boats, this division is made more or
less on equal terms.  Thus, most commonly 49% is shared out by the crew and the remaining
51% is set apart for the shipowner, although the latter percentage increases with the cost and
                                               
8 There are descriptions in the literature of a variation in which common expenditures are deducted
after splitting the gross revenue between the owner and the crew.  See, on this, Doeringer, Moss and
Terkla (1986, p. 52) and Sutinen (1979, p. 149, n. 4).9
productivity of the vessel.  These percentages change substantially with fishing technology and
particularly with the age and value of the vessel.9
The 49% allotment received by the crew is then allocated among crewmen according to a
previously agreed formula.  Frequently, it is divided by the number of fishermen plus 1.5 (so
that the value of one share is 0.49 [CV-SE] / [n+1.5], where n is the total number of people in
the boat, CV is the catch value and SE the total shared expenditures).   Every crewman earns
one of these shares except for the fishing skipper who receives two and the coast skipper who
takes one and a half.  Traditionally, the sharing is made openly, so that every crewman can
monitor the prices and the shares earned by others.  From his 51% participation in net revenue
the shipowner pays two additional shares, one to the fishing skipper and another one to the
machinist, as well as one half or one quarter of a share to the cook, and another quarter to the
greaser, if there is one.  After all these latter payments, the more skilled crewmen are thus
compensated more than the common crewmen.  Moreover, the shipowner has to pay other
expenditures, most of them of a fixed nature (ship’s insurance, financial charges and fishing
licenses).  The residual income, if any, compensates him for the cost of capital.
2.2. Full Profit Sharing in Small Boats
Smaller boats generally adopt a full-profit sharing arrangement.  This is, for instance, the
case of boats of between 3 and 9 tons that fish along the coast and return home daily.  They
divide net revenue as follows.  If there are two crewmen, the skipper receives one and a half
shares and his companion one; the boat owner, who is usually also the skipper, receives the
remaining half.  If there are three crewmen, net revenue is divided in seven shares, three for the
boat owner and four for the crew.  Many of these smaller boats use the “hand-lining” technique
in which the work of the skipper and one or two fishermen is limited to loosen and haul a long
set of hooks.  Slightly bigger boats begin to deviate from strict profit sharing.  This is the case
in the Bay of Biscay with boats of between 10 and 50 tons and fishing with crews of no more
                                               
9 See, also, Sutinen (1979, p. 159) and Platteau and Nugent (1992, p. 405).10
than 10 for periods lasting from three days to three weeks.  The skipper, who usually owns the
vessel, meets all oil expenditure and pays a Christmas and a summer stipend to crewmen. Fuel
and food provisions are paid out of the gross catch value, however. Most of these boats use
the most common and traditional fishing technique, known as “seining”.  This consists of
surrounding a school of fish with a net and pumping or brailing it aboard.
2.3. Revenue Sharing in the Largest Vessels
For the largest vessels in the industry, the sharing system generally transforms itself into a
bonus system.  However, it departs notably from bonus systems in conventional firms.  Firstly,
fishing bonuses are linked to the total revenue or production of the vessel instead of
assessments of individual productivity.  Secondly, they form the bulk of labor compensation
instead of being a minor part.
These bigger vessels (up until 2000 tons) have crews of up to 100, although most
commonly around 30-50, sail for longer periods (three to five months) and fish in remote seas,
far away from their bases. They are typically owned by firms that operate several vessels
around the world, from just a few up to 143 (in our sample).  These vessels have production
processes that are somewhat more complex.  Many of them not only catch the fish but also
clean it and freeze it.  For instance, the leading Spanish firm processes 80% of its total catch
itself and sells it under its own brand names.   As a consequence, there is substantial
specialization of resources — e.g., some workers only do a particular job such as cooking,
sorting, processing (cleaning, cutting, freezing and storing fish) and extracting oil.
In some cases, crews do not stay in these vessels for the whole sailing season, work shifts
are adopted when fishing and most of the catch is sold to either internal divisions,
intermediaries or in foreign fishing markets.  Many of these vessels do not even enter port to
unload the catch, which is landed by cargo or factory vessels.  In these cases, recruiting
decisions are land-based.  Ships’ captains retain and exert close to discretionary firing rights,
however.11
There is also some variety in compensation structures within these vessels.  For instance, in
large freezer-trawlers crewmen are paid a percentage of the estimated daily value of the catch.
Interestingly, some firms which in the past ran both kinds of vessels, freezers and fresh
trawlers, used different compensation systems, compensating trawlers’ crews under the
standard share system and paying freezers’ crews a variable bonus.  When the catch is
unusually low, they are guaranteed a relatively small fixed salary representing 40-50% of the
average total wage.  For small freezer-trawlers, the shares range from 0.8 to 1% of catch value
for a common seaman depending on his skill up to 7% for the best skippers (who in these large
ships are professional captains without ownership claims on the ships).  However,
compensation for crew members of large vessels using the line fishing technique in the deep
waters of Chile is derived from multiplying specific prices by the catch weight instead of value.
2.4. Historical Variety in the Share System
Sharing has been the standard organizational pattern of all kinds of fishing firms through
history, in both primitive societies (a) and more modern times (b) and (c), and taking in some
closely related activities such as piracy (d).
a) Primitive and collectivist societies.  Written records of a share system are found in
Roman Law, alluded to in the Lex Rodhia de iactu.10  More primitive societies also used
shares in fishing, however.  This is shown by the anthropological descriptions of primitive
cultures, including contemporary but isolated ones.  For instance, in a study of a Malay fishing
community in Rusembilan in South Thailand, Fraser (1966) relates how the share system is so
ingrained that even technological innovations tended to be shared until it became clear that
better solutions were available.  (In that case, new motor boats were initially used to tow
several boats, which then shared out their total catches.)  Finally, the compensation structure
of fishermen in the former Soviet Union, where all workers (including fishermen) received a
salary is also worth mentioning.  Fishermen also received a premium linked to their ship’s catch
                                               
10 See Digesto, book 14, title 2 (from García del Corral, 1988, pp. 762-6).12
however.  This bonus could be quite high, up to ten times their fixed wage.11  It seems that
Soviet fishermen were paid under a system closely resembling that used by large Western
vessels, which seems coherent considering that they were among the largest in the World.
b) The lay system of whalers.  Traditional whaling during 18th and 19th centuries
involved very long voyages, of up to four years, land-based financing, specialization of
ownership and control and large teams, with an average crew of 30.12  They were
compensated under the share or “lay” system with a percentage of the net value of the catch.
This was the amount that remained after paying common expenditures that included pilotage to
and from port, wharfage for the vessel, gauging the catch and coopering, commissions for
cargo handlers, security and insurance.13  Crewmen received equal shares or “lays”.  Captains
and officers were paid larger shares, with the captain receiving between 6 and 8%.  Additional
bonuses were also paid to those spotting the whales.  This lay system was thus quite similar to
the system of partial profit sharing currently used in medium-sized fishing boats.
c) Biscayan fishing in the 19th Century.  Given that a good part of our empirical evidence
comes from current practices in the Bay of Biscay, it is worth mentioning that historical
accounts of customary uses in the same geographical area reveal a similar pattern of sharing,
even though different technologies were used at the time.  For instance, in the middle of the
19th Century crews of 18 were common in the Basque Country.14  They were paid under a
share system, although land-based specialized ownership was common.  Shares were obtained
after paying common expenditures, including a fixed subsistence wage paid in kind.  Twenty
four shares were given one to each of the 18 crewmen, 4 to the shipowner, 1/4 to the skipper,
1/4 to each of the three seamen who saw to the cleaning, 1/2 to the ship’s woman and 1/2 to
the ship’s boy. Probably to avoid conflicts, the division of shares was performed at that time by
                                               
11 We thank Yuri Yegorov for the information on this case.
12 See Ellickson (1989), Craig and Knoeber (1992), Gifford (1993, p. 138) and Whipple (1995a).
13 See Craig and Knoeber (1992, pp. 608-9). 14See Saint-Léger and Delbet (1876) who describe
standard practices in the port of San Sebastian in 1856.13
a specialized agent working for the fishing market.  In less developed ports, shares were
divided by the skipper in a port tavern in the presence of the crew.
d) The share system of pirates.  The organization of pirate enterprises for centuries
followed a pattern of sharing not very different from the one used in fishing firms.
Interestingly, sharing was used by both privateers commissioned by Governments and by
independent pirates who operated without the protection of any public authority.  In both
cases, following each expedition the gross loot was sold on land or in open auction to the
crewmen.  The amount thus obtained was shared among the crew according to their jobs in the
vessel after paying the “common expenditures.”  For buccaneers raiding Spanish colonies and
the American seas in the XVII Century, these common expenses included compensation for
seamen crippled in combat as well as the additional fixed remuneration paid to the surgeon and
carpenter.  The remaining lot was shared out as follows: the ship’s captain, 2 parts; the warrant
officer, 1.5 parts; other officers and specialists, 1.25 parts; regular pirates, 1 part; and
aspirants, 0.5 parts.  These shares and other rules were explicitly formalized in a written
contract ex ante, probably to facilitate self-enforcement given the absence of judicial authority.
At the same time shares were also used by Mediterranean corsairs based on the Barbary Coast,
even though they were subject to a higher degree of State intervention and taxation.  Custom
and State rules, including a so-called Ancient Law, as well as frequent litigation, were common
features used in defining the shares.15  Regular navies also paid bounty shares to their crews in
addition to small salaries, but the sharing was much more unequal, with the officers receiving
larger and sailors much smaller shares.  For instance, in the British Navy during the XVIII
Century captains received 2/8; commanders, 1/8; officers, 3/8, and the rest of the crew only 2/8
(Whipple, 1995b, p. 81).  This might help to explain why recruitment was frequently by press-
gang, the need for punishments to enforce discipline and the high incidence of desertion.
                                               
15 For information on Mediterranean pirates, see Manca (1982) and Bono (1993) and, for American
pirates, Exquemelin (1678), Gall and Gall (1957) and Botting (1995).  Fontenay (1988, pp. 1334 and
1339) refers to the frequency of litigation in the island of Malta.14
3. The Controlling Role of Market Competition
The compensation structure of fishing firms is characterized by the fact that participants are
paid under a share system, linking individual compensation to team performance even for large
teams.  In the short-term, i.e., per each trip, individual compensation does not vary with
individual performance.16  Our argument for explaining the optimality of this kind of sharing
relates to the automatic long-term incentives it provides in terms of team composition  (“long-
term” meaning a setup of repeated trips).  Remunerating team members with shares in the
team’s net product usually motivates shirking because of free riding — all team members,
including the controller, enjoy the whole benefit of reduced effort but do not suffer the whole
reduction in productivity.  Shirking behavior may be prevented however if there is enough
competition amongst teams in the resource market so that eventual underperformance is
promptly penalized by changes in the composition of the teams.   This is the case with fishing
boats, in which corrective sanctions may be easily implemented if necessary by means of firing
and switching decisions that lower the reputation of individuals and force them to work in less
productive crews.
What seems to make this share system viable is then a market-driven mechanism of self-
enforcement, in which all kinds of individual and team underperformance are disciplined
through separation decisions which are either explicit (firing) or implicit (switching).  These
separation decisions are possible either way, with skippers dismissing underperforming seamen
—especially recent recruits— and better seamen moving to work in the most reliable and
productive vessels —frequently the newest ones.  Recruiting of fishing vessels, skippers and
crewmen is highly competitive.  It is usual in different fishing environments for crewmen to
leave underperforming skippers and for the best vessels and skippers to require higher
                                               
16 Except, obviously, for the effect individual performance has on collective performance and,
therefore, on individual shares, which decreases with team size.  Only in cases of gross
underperformance (e.g., drug addicts, seamen skipping unloading duties) may withdrawal of the total
share or of a part of it accompany the dismissal decision.  Moreover, specialized workers (the skipper,
the machinist, etc.) are paid more, but these differential wages take also the form of larger shares.  They
go with the job and are not linked to the individual productivity of specific workers.15
performance from their crews, in exchange for earning greater wages and exerting more
effort.17  Furthermore, as a consequence of competitive pricing, the allotment of the vessel and
the differences in compensation among crewmen are well explained as equilibrium prices that
are consistent with the special skills required in some tasks, specially those of the skipper,
work ability and effort and the characteristics of the vessel.18
The practices of firing underperformers and switching boats discipline and reward not only
crewmen but also skippers and shipowners.  Under widespread conditions, remunerating team
members with a share in the team’s net product would reduce the incentives of the residual
decision maker to discipline team members and, more generally, to control.  However, this
dilution of incentives crucially depends on the costs other members of the team incur if they
opt to leave the team.  If these costs are low, underperforming controllers may be easily “fired”
by team members by their signing up with a different team.  This is again the case in the fishing
industry, where the skipper seems to have the right incentives not to shirk his duties.
Otherwise, he himself would be implicitly dismissed, as the better crewmen would leave the
boat to work under better skippers.  This possibility therefore reduces the perverse effect of
the loss of residuality that is caused by having the crewmen sharing in the catch.19  Likewise,
those land-based shipowners who underperform in terms of failing to invest in their vessels will
lose their best skippers and crewmembers unless they accept lower shares.
In the fishing industry, firing and switching costs are low for two main reasons related to
the contractual and physical technology: the positive effect sharing has on the verification of
labor contracts by third-parties (a) and the relative unimportance of specific assets (b).  These
                                               
17 This fact has been pointed out by many authors dealing with fishing practices in different countries.
See, mainly, Firth (1946, p. 257), Acheson (1981, p. 278) as well as Bodvarsson (1987, p. 422),
Lleonart (1988, p. 327), Platteau and Nugent (1992, p. 393) and Sánchez (1992, p. 43).
18 A previous version of this paper included quantitative evidence on this point, which is available on
request from the authors.
19 Switching decisions by crewmen resemble those of corporate shareholders when they “vote with
their feet” by selling their shares.  However, in corporations, remaining team members do not suffer a
penalty in terms of lower productivity, as happens in fishing.16
two factors facilitate the use of separation decisions as disciplinary devices and greatly reduce
the cost of these decisions in fishing compared with other activities:20
a) Contractual factors are decisive in firstly reducing the cost of firing underperformers
and, secondly, increasing the sanction for underperformance.  Share wages provide incentives
for good crewmen not to support shirking colleagues when the later are sanctioned or
dismissed.  This not only reduces potential conflicts related to dismissals but converts crewmen
into informers and instigators of disciplinary actions against shirking colleagues.  In principle,
sharing should not be necessary to generate intense incentives.  On the contrary, salaries that
differ across vessels would do so, even if they were fixed in the short-term (e.g., if they pay a
certain amount for each trip, agreed in advance and independent of the catch).  Moreover,
these would not incur measurement costs and would provide a more efficient allocation of
risks.  Such an arrangement would impose high transaction costs, however, in one crucial
dimension.  Firing decisions would then be more costly to implement because of additional
difficulties in verifying underperformance.  In all systems, bad performers are paid above their
marginal productivity.  They have the incentives to spend resources in rent seeking, e.g.,
contesting dismissals.21  Individual performance cannot be verified by third parties in the
                                               
20 If the connection between switching costs and a share system is sound, one would expect to see a
correlation between both variables across industrial sectors.  Several hints show that this correlation
holds for other activities: (1) Professionals like auditors of financial statements, investment bankers and
business consultants, all of them partially remunerated on a share basis, are frequently recruited by
competing firms, which amounts to them dismissing their former employer.  (2) Teams in the
construction industry are organized along lines not very unlike those shown here for fishing ships, also
using dismissal of underperforming workers and team-leaders (González Díaz, 1994).
21 On the contrary, we would not expect that either efficiency wages or individual incentives would
face high renegotiation costs because of the repeated and durable character of fishing contracts.  In line
with the works by Goldberg and Erickson (1987) on petroleum coke contracts; a Masten and Crocker
(1991) on natural gas contracts; and, more generally, Klein (1996) and Klein and Murphy (1997), the
sharefishing arrangements we observe could be considered as mere price adjustment mechanisms.  From
this perspective, the advantage of sharing would not be in providing incentives but in assuring that the
ex post distribution of net income does not result in one or other party attempting to evade the
agreement and forcing a renegotiation.  We see two problems with the application of this view to
fishing.  First, the renegotiation problem does not arise for two reasons: the repeated nature of the
transactions and the easy verifiability of this kind of default in fixed-priced agreements.  Second, those
fish sharing contracts with fixed or advance payments by the shipowner would suffer this renegotiation
problem, being subject to opportunism in the absence of repeated transactions.17
vessel, although verification is necessary to enforce the contract.22  Crewmembers can observe
individual performance at low cost.  They are in a privileged position to help enforce the labor
contract.  Under fixed salaries, crewmen would have fewer incentives to observe and disclose
the underperformance of their peers and to attest, eventually, to the propriety of the firing
decision.  The share system thus helps the verification process by motivating crewmembers to
exploit their observational capabilities in the verification of labor contract.23  (The argument
can be also applied to salaries linked to individual performance, which would also incur
measurement costs and potential risk misallocation.)
Secondly, firing and switching decisions constitute sanctions that are more effective when
contracting decisions are based on parties’ reputations.  Verifiability of performance then plays
another important role: by aiding reputations to develop, it indirectly increases the sanctioning
power of separation decisions.  The essential data for captains’ reputations to evolve (the catch
value of their vessels) is relatively easy to verify, especially if a well functioning fish market
exists.  On the other hand, their behavior as contract enforcers (mainly in the labor contract
when deciding dismissals — less so in the ship-renting contract) as well as the performance of
the crew are more difficult to ascertain by the participants in markets for team-mates (future
shipowners and crewmen).  To this end, the most important source of information is provided
by the crew.  The fact that crewmen share the costs and benefits of these firing decisions
probably helps in conveying this information.  Reputations are also preserved by keeping the
recruitment on a local basis, which is common practice even nowadays except for the largest
                                               
22 These concepts come from the incomplete contract literature initiated by Grossman and Hart
(1986).  For an introduction, see Hart (1995, pp. 37-38 and Ch. 4).
23 This might explain the observation that discipline under the fixed-wage system of traditional
shipping was stricter than under the share system of whaling.  Gifford (1993, p. 147) sees this as a
consequence of sharing being a substitute for monitoring.  However, disciplinary actions (e.g., flogging)
are not monitoring but sanctioning activities.  Lesser discipline in this sense says nothing about the
extent of monitoring.  Our framework provides a different explanation.  Fixed wages would call for
more disciplinary action because monetary sanctions are contractually costly: the captain would be
accused of expropriation.  On the other hand, physical punishments do not suffer from this drawback.
Under sharing, however, monetary sanctions (dismissal, either during or after the voyage) are
automatically controlled by the fact that the captain would have to share the benefits of unfair
dismissals.18
vessels.24  Reputational mechanisms were also important in whaling, pirate and merchant ships.
Unsatisfied whaling crews even ran advertising campaigns against bad officers (Whipple,
1995a, p. 81).  Pirate captains with good reputations were able to get bigger shares and easy
recruitment.25  Reputation was also crucial with cargo traffic (Gifford, 1993, p. 140-1).
b) The main physical factor in reducing switching costs is that fishing technology uses
relatively little specific capital.  Switching boats or switching crews is not so costly therefore
as similar decisions in other industries.26  Physical assets (ships and fishing tackle) are specific
to the technique and in some cases the fishery, but are not specific to the crew.  This is shown
by the frequency of geographical reallocation and sales.27  With respect to human capital,
workers’ experience is important but not specific to the vessel, being applicable to different
vessels and even to different fishing techniques.28  The insignificance of compensation
differences across crewmen according to seniority or age (e.g., Sánchez, 1992, p. 43) is
coherent with this lack of specificity.  Another kind of labor specificity might develop,
however.  Given the peculiar working conditions at sea, crewmembers may suffer some degree
of specificity to their shipmates in relation to the living-together dimension of their work.  The
                                               
24 For multiple evidence in this regard, see McGoodwin (1976, pp. 378 and 386), Platteau and Nugent
(1992, p. 399), Gifford (1993, pp. 140-141) and, in particular, the references in Acheson (1981, pp.
279-280).  In Spain, individual reputations are enhanced by the existence of an official Marine ID card
in which all kinds of incidents, such as signing on, promotions or dismissals, are recorded and signed by
the skipper or captain, specifying the reason (e.g., missing the time of departure, refusal to sail in bad
weather, drunkenness, unpunctuality, absence from work, etc.).  In smaller ports with a close-knit
fishing community, dismissals are well known to everybody.  For this reason, they are not registered in
the ID card, allowing dismissed seamen to eventually sign on other ships.  In these cases, the threat of
recording the incident acts as a disciplinary device so powerfully that fired seamen do not suite for or
even claim their legally mandated severance pay.
25 Exquemelin relates how Captain Morgan received up to five or six parts, much more than the two
parts usually allocated to captains of pirate vessels (1971, p. 57).
26 Fishing boats are thus closer to “primitive” teams than to “relational” teams, using the terms
proposed by Williamson (1985, pp. 246-247).
27 The mobility of the fleet is shown by the fact that shipowners consider local prices when deciding
where to unload the catch, independently of the location of their base.  In addition, firms react very fast
to the introduction of quotas and incentives by creating joint ventures in foreign countries, which allow
them to redeploy their ships in other countries.
28  Seamen were fully standard resources during the 18th century, when seamen moved easily from
merchant vessels to the Navy and piracy (Rediker, 1987, p. 83).19
real importance of this variable is difficult to establish, but a reason to think it unimportant is
that this specificity probably develops faster in the friendly atmosphere of the most productive
teams, in which switching is less necessary.
It has also been claimed that “specificity” caused by back-loaded compensation was an
important feature of shipping and whaling in the 18 and 19th centuries (Gifford, 1993, p. 141).
However, this kind of hold-up threat disappears at the end of each voyage, then allowing a
complete switch of resources.  It might thus only pose a serious problem for very long trips
(such as those of old time whalers).  In any case, it loses importance when the length of the
voyage shortens, as has happened with all kinds of sea voyages during the 20th century.
Furthermore, it affects only one kind of switching decision — exit decisions by the crew — but
not dismissals of crewmen.29  Deferred compensation in whalers should then be seen as a
safeguard,30 more than as a source of conflict, given that decision rights were allocated in a
way that facilitated self-enforcement (the potential reputational losses were surely higher for
shipowners and captains than for common crewmen.31)  Furthermore, another physical factor
attenuates a similar problem, caused by friction in the labor market.  This is the seasonal and
discontinuous character of many fisheries,32 that provides a natural pattern for the sequence of
performance evaluation and crew renewal and recontracting which is followed by most vessels
in those fisheries.  This probably reduces the duration of switching-induced unemployment and,
therefore, switching costs.
                                               
29 This is exemplified by the practice of 19th century New England whalers who replaced their less
productive recruits with more experienced Portuguese seamen on their first stop in the Azores (Whipple,
1995a, p. 102).
30 Even Gifford (1993, p. 140) points out that it served to prevent crewmen from deserting when
touching ports where labor was scarce.  Nowadays, long term contracts (lasting two and three years)
seem to be common only in Asian fisheries both for skippers and crews.  Crews are paid a stipend for
three years and only receive the full value of their share at the end.  (We thank Mike A. McCoy for
information on the existence of these contracts).
31 The analysis in terms of a “self-enforcement range” developed by Klein (1992 and 1996) and Klein
and Murphy (1997) seems applicable here.
32 See Ferris and Plourde (1982, p. 427).20
The role played by market competition in controlling team production in fishing does not
mean that the typical features of a firm are not present.  Control in these organizations is
market-driven, but work is organized by chains of command and hierarchy and most teams are
durable.  Firstly, one of the main functions of skippers is to monitor individual performance.33
This is understandable because in all fishing firms he is always the only decision-maker in
relation to crew dismissals.  These decisions cannot be made without reliable information.  The
skipper uses many different devices to assess individual productivity.  In small boats, this has
always been easy given their size and the nature of the tasks.  In large vessels, a simple
hierarchy with one or two levels exerts mainly monitoring functions.  Nowadays it is also
common to install television cameras that extend the skipper’s view to the holds.  Recording
systems are then occasionally used to verify underperformance.  Secondly, and more revealing,
the team structure is durable despite the strong competition for resources and the short-term
character of formal contracts.34  Traditionally, crews in all kinds of vessel renew slowly and the
two main causes for changes are the different requirements of each kind of vessel.  Ocean
fishing, being more demanding, usually attracts younger fishermen who in their later years
move to coastal fishing.  In addition, the best seamen tend to move to the newest and most
productive boats, in what would probably be explained by the efficiency of “matching”
resources of similar productivity.
                                               
33 See, for instance, Bodvarsson (1987, p. 422), Platteau and Nugent (1992, pp. 398 and 407).  It has
only rarely been claimed that skippers do not monitor individual performance.  For instance, Lleonart
(1988, p. 324).  In addition, some of the anthropological studies claim that skippers act mainly as
coordinators (Acheson, 1981, pp. 278-9).  However, these assertions do not fit most of the descriptions
in the literature nor our evidence.
34 Data on contract length and the effective duration of contractual relationships both support our
view.  Firstly, the ratio of workers under unlimited length labor contracts in the Spanish fishing industry
(69.47%) is even higher than that of the economy as a whole (64.76%).  These contracts involve
mandatory indemnities for dismissal of as much as 42 months wages.  Secondly, the effective length of
the relationships are slightly greater in fishing, as judged from the distribution of workers according to
seniority: in fishing, 21.09% of workers have been in their current job for less than a year; 28.12%
between one and six years; and 50.64 for more than six years.  For industries generally these figures are
28.60%, 21.25% and 50.10% respectively.  Data for these calculations comes from the Spanish
Encuesta de Población Activa (Labor Force Survey), 3rd quarter, 1995.21
Basically, we have argued that team production is controlled here by means of market
competition for resources, which is induced by teamsharing and which is made possible by low
switching costs and reinforced verifiability.  However, two other facilitating factors are
necessary to explain the viability of the share system in general and the deviations from pure
profit sharing in particular.  These are firstly the costs of measuring different dimensions of
team performance such as team output (catch value or volume) and specific inputs and,
secondly, the cost that sharing may cause in terms of risk misallocation when participants hold
different preferences towards risk bearing.  These are the topics of the next two sections.
4. Measurement Costs
We focus now on measurement problems in order to explain firstly how knowledge of team
output is necessary to make a share system viable and the role of the fish market and other
practices in safeguarding this measurement.  Secondly, we show how different measurement
costs may be driving the adoption of particular varieties of sharing in the product and the costs
of fishing vessels.
4.1. Team Output Measurement
Collective remuneration is facilitated by the very fact that team product is easy to measure.
This is true both in absolute and relative terms.  Absolute performance is almost perfectly
known at low cost, avoiding one of the conflicts that make share systems difficult to implement
in other technological environments.35 Absolute and relative performance are easy to measure
                                               
35 The cost of verifying team output provides an alternative explanation for the difference observed in
compensation patterns between fishing and shipping.  Gifford (1993) shows how in the 18th and 19th
centuries crews in shipping vessels were paid monthly wages and end-of-voyage lump-sum amounts,
which did not vary with the profits of the voyage.  However, crews in whalers were paid under a share
system, what has been explained as a substitute for monitoring crewmen effort (Gifford, 1993, pp. 145-
7).  He claims, first, that whaling output is more linked to crew performance while shipping output is
affected mainly by the decisions made by the owner and the captain and, second, that the share system is
more needed in whalers to motivate performance.  Both claims seem, however, unwarranted to us.22
because production cycles are well delimited: costs are easy to allocate to every fishing voyage
and the revenue obtained is generally certified by the fish markets.  Similarly, teams’ relative
performance is easy for all their members to ascertain.  Fishermen regularly exchange
information about their earnings, a practice that probably serves to monitor both team
productivity and the ship-owner’s trustworthiness.  Furthermore, when catches are sold in the
open market, a good indication of earnings is already provided by the gross value of the catch,
which is publicly known.  We have observed that, by the time they return home to unload and
sell their catch to intermediaries after 5 or 6 months of sailing, they have collected enough
information from other vessels to predict their earnings correctly.
Revenue and cost accounts are customarily audited by crewmen.  In many vessels, copies
of cost invoices are made available for examination on the bridge by all crewmen.  In some
cases, trusted friends help crewmen in checking these accounts.  When the boat is based and
staffed on a local basis, a trusted third-party expert takes care of the accounts.  The presence
of these monitoring activities shows that measurement problems are important.  However, they
also show that they are solvable.  The latter is a distinguishing feature of fishing relative to
conventional firms.
The role of fish markets should be emphasized.  They play more than the standard
neoclassical functions, acting as contract-safeguarding institutions.  This explains firstly that, in
our case, prices of fresh fish are reached through sophisticated public auctions.  (Interestingly,
frozen fish poses lesser problems because it presents lower price variability.)  Secondly, the
market takes care of the payments and, crucially, it also provides each seller with a voucher
certifying the proceeds from the sale.  It is not by coincidence that the market is financed and
run by a Cofradía, a kind of association or cooperative in which all relevant contractual parties
                                                                                                                                                  
First, the performance of fishing boats crucially depends on the captain’s ability (see, for all, Acheson,
1981, pp. 289-91).  Also, shipping performance also depends on the crew’s behavior (e.g., in handling
cargo).   Second, the reduction in free riding induced by a sharing rule would be minimal in the
environment described by Gifford (teams of over 30 people, unobservable effort).  Our argument
provides a different explanation that does not need specific assumptions about monitoring technology
and free-riding.  This is that measurement of net output was and still is much more costly and prone to
conflicts in shipping.  Keep in mind that, at the time, shipping was closely related to trading, further
complicating measurement of net output.23
—shipowners, skippers and seamen— participate.  Thirdly, these cooperatives also achieve
economies of scale in the provision of frozen storage and bait and in the performance of some
administrative tasks for the port’s vessels.  In Spain, historical records on these organizations
date back to the XI Century.36 The safeguarding role of the market has been more generally
described even in primitive fishing communities.37
The safeguarding role of the fish market is also indirectly revealed by the policies adopted
for out-of-market transactions covering that part of the catch which is sold privately,
frequently to evade paying taxes.  In this case, specific and additional arrangements are used.
In the Bay of Biscay, fish by way of wages in kind is now systematically cashed-in individually.
When sold collectively, underground buyers tend to be well known to several crewmen.  If this
is not the case because the vessel is far from home, two seamen accompany the ship-owner
during the sale.  In any case, fish for these transactions is put aside at sea in the presence of
some crewmen.  In a similar vein, the fish market does not provide any protection against the
risk that crewmembers could cheat land-based shipowners by means of hidden sales, as
mentioned by Platteau and Nugent (1992, p. 403).  This does not seem to be a serious
problem, however.  Collusion by large crews would be easy to break down.  For small crews,
collusion would be more sustainable, but concealing sales would be more difficult, as they
                                               
36 According to the Cofradía de Pescadores “Virgen de las Mareas” (1990, p. 3).
37 See, e.g., Firth (1946, pp. 193-5).  It seems that in less developed fishing communities, two kinds of
problems arise in the direct relationship between ship-owners and intermediaries, both on them
exacerbated by the high price volatility of fresh fish.  Firstly, anthropologists have studied the problems
between intermediaries and ship-owners in relation to the informational advantage of the former, leading
in some cases to a solution in which fishermen’s wives take care of fish distribution.  They have also
collected evidence on a large number of initiatives all over the world to develop what they call
fishermen’s co-operatives in order to solve these problems.  See, for references on this issue, Acheson
(1981, 282-285) as well as Wilson (1980, pp. 496-498) for an economic analysis.  Secondly, we argue
that direct contracting would also cause trouble in the contract between the crew and the ship-owner,
because of the possibility of side payments between the ship-owner and the intermediary.  Two pieces of
evidence support our claim: additional safeguards are used for underground sales, as explained in the
main text;  and many large ships selling directly pay their crew in terms of the standard value or the
volume of the catch, instead of its real value.  See, however, Gallick (1996) for a case in which
exclusive contracts for the catch may reduce a type of transaction cost: that relating to sorting catches to
be canned instead of consumed fresh.  Interestingly, in this case the valuation problem might be also
easier to solve for the crew, given the absence of product and price variation.24
would take place closer to their base.  Furthermore, specialized ownership is rare for small
boats, perhaps to avoid this kind of cheating.    In fact, the only case we know in which this
was a real problem was that of corsairs subject to a high degree of taxation in the
Mediterranean  (Fontenay, 1988, p. 1337).
Net product measurement is more difficult for larger vessels in multi-vessel firms.  These
usually sell their catches at transfer prices to internal divisions for further processing and
commercial distribution.  However, even in these cases team product is easier to evaluate than
for other industries, because clear physical references are available in relation to the time spent
sailing and the volume of the catch.  It is noteworthy that the largest firms calculate the catch-
linked bonuses they pay to crewmen as percentages of catch value or volume, not of net
revenue, as smaller firms do.  Even if this linkage of variable compensation to gross output
impedes crewmen in larger firms from internalizing common expenditures, it offers the
advantage of being less subject to “gaming” and manipulation by the shipowner.  Furthermore,
in many of these vessels crewmen sail for shorter periods than the vessel.  Profit sharing would
then require a proper allocation of costs amongst crews in order to provide efficient incentives.
(In addition, departures from full profit sharing, in which some or all costs are paid by the
shipowner, may have some effect on risk allocation, as we will analyze below.)
The different costs of measuring the several factors or dimensions of vessel production are
also sufficient to explain the variety of bonus systems observed in large vessels.   Firstly, when
the vessels sail for longer periods than their crews, bonuses are calculated and accumulated on
a daily basis by measuring the daily catch.  This is necessary to avoid the kind of lengthy
voyages typical of old-time whalers.  Secondly, bonuses are defined in terms of value or
volume according to the different incentives and measurement costs they give rise to.  Catch
value is used by freezer-trawlers, in which the value of the daily catch is estimated through
standard or market-based prices, which are frequently updated (even during a trip). This
method suffers from higher measurement costs but provides better incentives for crews fishing
several species of diverse value.  In particular, it avoids gaming behavior, consisting of a bias
to heavier species, which would be easily brought about by using a single average price or a25
volume-linked bonus.  On the contrary, Chilean longliners fishing only one species base their
bonuses on catch volume.  It is also worth mentioning that crews in medium sized boats, who
are customarily paid according to catch value and not to catch volume, are able to affect the
value of the fish to a higher degree than the crews of freezers.  For instance, these boats sell
fresh fish, whose appearance is more important to obtain higher prices in the market.
All in all, one characteristic of fishing is that team output is relatively easy to measure.  On
the other hand, contracting labor in terms of individual productivity seems to be as costly as in
other activities, which might explain why an alternative arrangement to the share system, based
on incentives linked to individual short-term performance would not do so well.  Unlike team
performance, individual productivity is difficult to evaluate in terms of both observability by
managers (here, the skipper) and verifiability by third parties.  Firstly, it requires a more
continuous measurement of performance. More information is thus required than that
necessary to make discontinuous decisions, such as dismissals.  Furthermore, individual
incentives would motivate gaming behavior by crewmembers, also making real performance
more difficult to measure.  Second, adjustments in individual compensations would be subject
to high contractual costs as opportunism could easily emerge since it is difficult for third
parties to verify individual performance.  We are thinking of the problem of distinguishing
sanctions for underperformance from opportunistic decisions.  On the one hand, as the residual
earner, the skipper would have an incentive to underrate crewmen performance.  On the other
hand, other crewmembers have no incentive to demand sanctions or lower pay for
underperforming co-workers.  Furthermore, both of these difficulties are exacerbated if this
kind of economically rational sanctioning decision is costly to produce. Under the share
system, however, all crewmen have a monetary interest in the sanctioning decisions (which
take the form of dismissals) and also, one would expect, in verifying the performance of their
teammates.  We have gathered some casual evidence that workers are willing to act as
witnesses against fellow workers in judicial procedures hearing claims for unfair dismissal.26
4.2. Cost Measurement
Measurement costs also account for the detailed pattern of differential cost sharing, the
contracting patterns in relation to vessel ownership and the specific payments that the
shipowner makes.  The pattern of cost sharing differs mainly with the nature and incentive
properties of the costs involved.  In most medium-sized vessels, several expenses are
traditionally divided almost equally between the shipowner and the crew.  These include bait,
fishing tackle and food provisions.38  In contrast, expenditures on fuel oil, fishing licenses,
vessel insurance, major repairs and financial charges are paid in full by the shipowner.
Crewmembers are probably more able efficiently to affect the level of the first group of
expenses.  Consequently, making them pay part of them induces cost containment.
Conversely, sharing in the other types of cost would induce inefficiently low levels of
expenditure, most clearly in vessel repairs and all kinds of durable investments, given the
ownership patterns described below.  Renegotiations and adjustments around this pattern
confirm such an explanation.  Crews in several ports began to pay for fuel consumption after
abandoning their traditional fishing grounds in EU waters for Moroccan seas.  It seems that
longer distances induced higher variability in fuel consumption, which needed to be controlled.
In some other cases, fuel and oil are separated.  E.g., in small boats, the crew shares in the cost
of fuel, but the shipowner pays the whole consumption of oil.  The rationale behind this
selective pattern is a high variability of fuel consumption, which might give rise to disputes
between the two or three fishermen in these boats, combined with the desire to motivate an
optimum use of oil and engine maintenance.
Patterns of ownership of physical assets and the allocation of all capital-related
expenditures in general (such as repairs, insurance, financial charges) can also be explained by
the difficulties in measuring the performance of those making decisions regarding such assets.
In fishing, most decisions on the use of assets are allocated to the captain (with the exception
of a few which are within the scope of the machinist).  Given that it is not easy to control or
                                               
38 An exception to this general pattern is found in the largest ships.  For them, cost sharing would be
too costly in terms of measurement, given the need to allocate many costs on a daily or even shift basis.27
measure the consequences of these decisions, a simple way of providing efficient incentives is
to make the captain the owner of the vessel.  This solution presents some financial difficulties
however when the value of the vessel increases.  Therefore, specialization or “separation” of
ownership and control (not in the sense of disperse ownership but of land-based ownership)
increases with vessel value: it is very rare for small boats but total for the largest vessels, with
intermediate degrees for medium-sized boats.39  When separation of ownership and control is
present, several control devices are used to align the incentives of captains and land-based
owners.  For medium-sized boats, intermediate levels of specialized ownership are common by
means of partnerships, making the skipper a part owner.  Furthermore, in these cases call
options are frequently granted to the skipper in order for him to hold the residual claim on the
vessel and, consequently, motivate him to maximize its value.   In addition, in many of these
vessels, the owner pays one additional share each to the machinist and the skipper and between
a half and a quarter to the greaser.  This practice probably induces them to maintain the vessel
in good condition, because of the possibility of withholding or renegotiating these shares.
Finally, as a general point for all types of vessel but mainly for the bigger ones, mention should
be made of an old tradition of professional norms motivating the captain to care for the vessel.
5. The Role of Risk Allocation
When there is substantial variability in the net value of production, risk allocation may be
an objective or a constraint in the design of compensation systems.  In our case, in which
participants are compensated with a share of net product, risk allocation may play different
                                               
39 Specialization of ownership and control has also been shown to increase with mechanization in
primitive fishing communities (Epple, 1977, as reported by Pollnac, 1978, pp. 3 and 7).  Ships provide
an interesting case of separation of ownership and control, as the whole of the value invested in the
vessel and its cargo will occasionally depend on single decisions taken by the captain.  On the other
hand, investment decisions are unique and easy to monitor.  For a very interesting study of what they
call “manager shareholding”, see Craig and Knoeber (1992).  Studying 19th Century whalers, these
authors conclude that manager shareholding was part of an incentive contract between owners and
managers or masters (who we have called “skippers”).28
roles depending on the structure of the participants’ preferences toward risk bearing.  When
these preferences are homogenous, sharing may produce the optimal allocation of risk.  On the
other hand, while some participants are more risk averse than others, i.e., preferences are
heterogeneous, the best solution would be, ceteris paribus, for the less averse to bear the
additional risk.  In these circumstances, sharing imposes a cost in term of “inefficient” risk
allocation.
The second situation seems the most plausible in fishing firms, discarding a naive
explanation of the share system as simply a way of spreading risks.  On the contrary, the
evidence is compatible with an explanation of sharing as an incentive mechanism, one of the
costs of which may be some degree of inefficient risk allocation.  This evidence comes mainly
from the use of a share system even in large vessels where risk preferences may be confidently
assumed to differ substantially between ship-owners and the crew.  Owners of larger vessels
are closer to risk neutrality than seamen with respect to catch-related risks.  For instance, the
largest multi-vessel firm in our sample has 143 large vessels and is controlled by a diversified
family group, with 30% of the shares freely floating in the Stock Exchange and more than 10%
owned by financial institutions.  Historical evidence is also provided by 19th century whalers
and Mediterranean corsairs.  In both cases, the enterprises were financed by land-based ship-
owners and entrepreneurs (including, in the case of corsairs, the religious order of Saint John
of Jerusalem and the Barbary States) who were clearly less risk-averse than their crewmen.
However, the latter were paid always with shares, as explained above.
It then seems that risk allocation is not a cause but a constraint in the design of the share
system.  The function of this system is not to spread risks among participants in the firm but to
provide them with efficient incentives.  In so doing, it eventually incurs some cost, amongst
many others, of risk misallocation.  In fact, some of the regularities we commented on may be
explained as a way of reducing this cost. These are connected to (a) cost sharing, (b) fixed or
guaranteed wages, (c) saving arrangements and (d) bonus design:
a) The variety of sharing structures described in Section 2 relates mainly to different
degrees of cost sharing.  Under the pure profit sharing regime of small boats, more risks are29
shared that under the gross revenue sharing system of large vessels. This would be consistent
with the structure of risk preferences argued previously.
b) Guaranteed minimum wages have similar properties in terms of risk allocation and their
use follows the same pattern.  We find that the use of these fixed wages — independent of
catch value — increases with the size of the boat: It begins at zero for small boats, takes the
form of remuneration in kind and its monetary substitute for medium-sized vessels and, finally,
larger firms guarantee a minimum monthly salary whatever the value of the catch.
Furthermore, fixed wages are usually adjusted upwards when the risk increases, as when the
vessel has to search for a new fishing ground.  These fixed wages may then show the existence
of differences in risk preferences between the crew and the shipowner.
c) In many boats mechanisms also exist in order to accumulate savings and smooth the
expenditure possibilities.  In some small boats, a share from each voyage is reserved and
accumulated for distribution at Christmas and summer holidays, as well as to pay Social
Security contributions in months of poor catches.  In some larger vessels, shipowners have also
agreed to pay two stipends to crewmen around holiday times.   Furthermore, providers of
inputs traditionally postpone debt collection in times of scarce catches, allowing fishermen to
obtain some subsistence wage.  These arrangements do not speak directly of different risk
preferences, but it seems reasonable that workers assessing such formulas have different wealth
than their employers, who do not value them and even finance them occasionally.40
                                               
40 Two other kinds of insurance practices are also common, although they are not relevant to our
argument.   Firstly, as mentioned earlier, some boats form “clubs” or “clusters” to exchange information
about fishing grounds and even to share the total catch among their members.  Economies of scale in the
production of information probably play a part in the practice of sharing it.  Bartering information
within clubs seems to be the predominant arrangement when fishing for highly mobile species that live
in large shoals, especially when the capacity of the boats is smaller than the shoals and they fish far
from their home port (Wilson, 1990).  Secondly, within each boat arrangements also exist to reduce the
cost of individual bad luck.  Thus, in some ports, when a crewman is sick he keeps earning his share, in
return handing over his Social Security payments, which are much smaller.   Similarly, when a crewman
dies, his family continues to receive his share for one year.  These patterns diversify risks within a group
of boats or within boat members, but they are compatible with equal risk preferences, thus providing no
hint on the impact of risk on the share system.30
d) Risk avoidance may also explain the structure of bonuses in large vessels as devices for
minimizing the influence of exogenous variables on crewmen’s compensation.  In our sample
of cases, the high variability suffered by market prices (e.g., it fluctuated in the 1995-1996
season between 1,800 and 7,000 US$/ton) of catches by longliners might explain the use of
volume-linked bonuses, given that it isolates seamen against short-term variability in fish
prices.  (However, measurement and incentive effects are also present, as explained above.
Furthermore, verifiability of prices might be negatively correlated with variability.  On the
other hand, large trawlers link their bonuses to the estimated value of the catch, using certain
standard prices for different species.  This was explained previously as a way of inducing
efficient incentives in terms of catch mix.  However, risk allocation might also be playing a
role: those vessels that use relatively fixed prices are able to simultaneously allocate the risk of
price movements efficiently without inducing gaming behavior on the part of the crew.
Nevertheless, the sparseness of standard price adjustments may also be explained as a result of
measurement costs.
The role of risk allocation should not be overemphasized, even as a contractual constraint.
Some of these contractual practices make sense even under homogenous risk preferences.
Thus, minimum wages in vessels sailing for long periods and saving devices may be understood
as self-commitment instruments,41 a rationale that fits neatly with sociological descriptions of
the proclivity of fishermen to overspend.  In addition, we have shown above that the observed
                                               
41 Self-commitment has been dealt with by, among many others, Schelling (1978, 1980), Thaler and
Shefrin (1981) and Hirschman (1982).  This rationale could be applied more generally.  Under costly
rationalizing, crewmen compensated with salaries that were totally fixed in the short-term might fail to
make consistent choices in terms of both their own effort and their support for disciplinary action taken
in respect of their companions.  In our particular case, short-term variability might help to reduce the
cost of self-control with respect to situations in which there is a need to apply extreme effort (e.g., 20-
hour workdays to make the most of good luck).  The seaman considering whether to keep working
during the 20th hour might be helped in his decision by having a share in the catch.  Short-term variable
compensation thus provides a way of pre-committing himself to make substantial efforts.  Furthermore,
when judging or supporting disciplinary decisions regarding teammates, crewmen might also be less
prone to fall prey to forgiveness under variable than under fixed compensation.31
differences in cost sharing and bonus design can be easily explained by differences in
measurement costs. Overall, risk allocation seems to play a secondary role.42
6. Summary and Conclusions
The main argument of this paper is that repeated team production can be organized
efficiently under a profit sharing regime.  Using the fishing firm as a case study, we identify
which unusual circumstances are necessary for this to happen: low costs of switching teams
and low costs of measuring team output.
Fishing firms present a puzzle.  On the one hand, their physical technology is that of team
production with specialized monitoring (the skipper or captain is the main element in this
monitoring activity).  It is well known that the standard contractual solution for this physical
technology is the conventional firm, in which the controller receives all the residual income.
On the other hand however, we systematically observe that real fishing firms do not adopt this
conventional pattern.  On the contrary, all kinds of fishing boats, in all times and countries, and
even with crews of up to 100 people, follow slightly different variations of a so-called “share”
system.  Under this share system, all members of the team (which includes at least the skipper,
the seamen and the ship-owner) receive a certain share of the boat’s income.
We explain the use of the share system as a mechanism for providing powerful incentives
connected to team membership.  These incentives are based on three kinds of lay-off or firing
decisions.  Firstly, the explicit dismissal of under-performing crewmen by the skipper.
Secondly, the explicit dismissal of under-performing skippers by ship-owners.  Thirdly, and
maybe most importantly, the implicit dismissal of the whole team by any team member who
                                               
42 Thus supports the viewpoint made explicit by, among others, Williamson (1985, pp. 389-390),
Rubin (1989, p. 162) and Barzel (1989, pp. 12 and 31, n. 1).  See, for empirical analyses, Allen and
Lueck (1992, 1993, 1995) regarding agricultural contracts and their references.32
decides to quit for a more productive boat.  Sharing has been shown to provide strong
motivation for these separation decisions.
In other words, we identify competition amongst teams for productive resources, made
possible by low costs of switching teams, as the fundamental force behind the share system.
Low switching costs are connected to contractual and physical conditions.  On the contractual
side, sharing increases the net benefit of disciplinary decisions (it simultaneously reduces the
cost of these decisions to the performing party and increases the cost these decisions cause to
the underperforming party.)  On the physical side, specific assets are relatively unimportant.  It
is in fact the case that in fishing most resources are of the general-purpose kind.
This competition for resources benefits also from very low costs of measuring team
product, for several reasons: production cycles are well defined; products are auctioned in
open markets with clear contractual functions; inputs are easy to monitor; and, finally, there
are no common costs to allocate among products or teams.  Consequently, team productivity is
easy to verify.  It is noteworthy that the physical technology of the largest fishing firms implies
that they suffer higher measurement costs.  To avoid having to allocate costs across catches,
boats or crews, we observe that shares are then defined in terms of gross income, instead of
net income.  It is also the case that in smaller vessels, the crew shares in the costs that are more
likely to be subject to moral hazard, such as food and maintenance, but not in those costs
which are not affected by the crew’s behavior, for instance, the cost of licenses or oil and fuel
consumption in coastal fishing.
Sharing is not driven by risk allocation.  On the contrary, risk seems to be constraining the
use of a sharing system.  Sharing has been explained on occasions simply as a way of spreading
risks.  We reject this claim on empirical grounds because the share system is used even when
risk preferences are heterogeneous.  We argue that precisely the opposite may happen, with
some inefficient allocation of risks being accepted as a cost to achieve powerful incentives.
This argument is consistent with some regular patterns in relation to partial sharing, minimum
wages, savings instruments and price risk.  However, alternative explanations have also been33
delineated for all of these patterns based on self-control and measurement costs, without any
reliance on risk allocation.  Risk thus seems to play a relatively minor role.
Finally, we have also tried to show why the share system is superior, under these
conditions, to the two main alternative arrangements.  Firstly, individual incentives linked to
individual performance would suffer higher costs in terms of verification and, therefore,
contract enforcement.  Secondly, efficiency wages, which would pay the crewmen a fixed
premium salary per trip and would sanction under-performance with dismissal, could provide a
better solution in terms of risk allocation.  However, the contract would also be more difficult
to enforce because of verification problems. Under the share system on the other hand,
workers frequently testify against their under-performing partners when the latter dare to
litigate their dismissal.  Costly rationality related to self-control problems also reinforces our
arguments in this regard.
Summing up, we claim that profit sharing enjoys a substantial advantage over other forms
of compensation (pay per performance and efficiency wages): it facilitates verification and,
therefore, enforcement of the labor contract.  It is a superior form, however, only when two
relatively rare conditions are present: low costs of switching teams and low costs of measuring
the team’s product.  These conditions are absent in most non-fishing firms, and this explains
why the share system is not the prevalent form of organization of the firm.  However, some of
the features of this system of implicit control might be spread more widely than it seems at first
sight.  We consider that, under different compensation structures, a similar phenomenon occurs
when any type of highly productive workers decide to leave their employer.  Their departure
puts pressure and forces changes in all kinds of organizations.  Switching-driven automatic
control also takes place within multidivisional organizations.  Our understanding of fishing
firms suggests that managers should pay attention to competition within the organization in the
design of profit-sharing plans and group incentives. Further research into which are the relative
weights of and connections between the required conditions is necessary, however, before
conclusions might be eventually reached and managerial applications developed.34
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Figure 1. The share system in a medium-sized fishing boat
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